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his wife, CHARLEs E. DAVEY, and
JANE DoE DAVEY, whose true name
is unknown, RALPH M. DAVEY, and
BETH S. DAVEY, his wife, et al.,
Defendants CVJid Respondents.

Case No. 7,896
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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
RENNOLD PENDER,

Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
T. C. JAcKsoN and RuBY G. JAcKsoN,
his \Yife, CHARLES E. DAVEY, and
JANE DoE DAVEY, whose true name
is unknown, RALPH M. DAVEY, and
BETH S. DAVEY, his wife, et al.,

CAsE No. 7,896

Defendants and Respondents.

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
The nature of respondents' arguments and the desire to inform the Court of other pertinent and relevant
matters in relation thereto, impel the submission of this
reply brief by appellant.

STATEMENT OF POINTS ARGUED
The argument in this re~ply brief will he dire·cted
towards refutation of the respondents' seven points,
under the headings :
POINT I
ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE OF ADVERSE HOLDING IS
EQUIVALENT TO OPEN, NOTORIOUS, AND HOSTILE POSSESSION OF LAND.
POINT II
APPELLANT DID TAKE POSSESSION OF THE
GROUND, AND AS OCCUPANT USE IT FOR INVESTMENT,
ETC., ADVERSELY.
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POINT III
APPELLANT'S ACTS OF POSSESSION WERE MORE
THAN CASUAL, OCCASIONAL TRESPASSES-ACTUALLY
ADVERSE POSSESSION.
POINT IV
DOCTRINE OF DAY VS. STEELE DOES NOT PRECLUDE RECOVERY HERE BY APPELLANT-INAPPLICABILITY.
POINT V
APPELLANT DID OCCUPY THE LAND CONTINUOUSLY, HOSTILELY, EXCLUSIVELY, OPENLY, AND NOTORIOUSLY.
POINT VI
TELONIS VS. STALEY DOCTRINE SHOULD STILL BE
ABROGATED.
POINT VII
ALLEGED WRONGFUL ASSESSMENT OF NO AVAIL
TO RESPONDENT.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE OF ADVERSE HOLDING IS
EQUIVALENT TO OPEN, NOTORIOUS, AND HOSTILE POSSESSION OF LAND.

Since respondents' initial point for argument [i.e.
necessity for :possession that is continuous, hostile, open,
notorious, and exclusive-Page 2, Respondents' Brief]
contains a comprehensive list of subjects which are
elsewhere more fully discussed in their brief, it is
deemed best to make rebuttal argument on most of
them under the later headings \vhere they are more
fully set out, rather than under a heading \vhich is supported solely by a single brief quotation of la\\T as in
their brief.
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Respondents assume that IN ALL CASES, the notoriety, openness, and hostile character of appellant's
possession must AS SUCH be shown and proven. This
is not ALL the law, and ·without in anywise admitting
that there "\Yas any lack of such notoriety, openness or
hostility in appellant's occupation of the ground in
question,-all of which appears more fully at rp~ages 6
through 13 of Appellant's Brief heretofore submitted,
"\Ve feel it incumbent to bring to the Court's attention
the fact that notoriety, openness, and the hostile !Or
adverse character of the claimant, are not always required to be shown as respondents assume, for, although:
''It is essential to the acquisition of title hy
adverse possession that the true owner shall have
knowledge or notice, actual or constructive, that
the possession is hostile or adverse.'' [Section 45,
Adverse Possession, 2 Corpus Juris Secundum,
page 558]
yet such notice may arise or be deemed given by either
of two methods :
"The true owner must have actual knowledge
of the hostile claim,

OR
the possession must be so open, visible, and notorious as to raise a presumption to, or knowledge by him of the adverse claim''. [Section 45,
Adverse P·ossession, 2 Corpus Juris Secundum,
·page 558].
Certainly, in this case, in addition to the character
of appellant's use, occupation, and possession of the
ground in question, it appears that this adverse claim
of right \Ya~ PERSON ALLY known and communicated
to respondents. Respondents Davey vvere aware of the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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issuance of the tax deed, and, appellant offered to sell
his adverse claims and interest to Davey [Rec. 82, 87,
91], and appellant here, as early as 1941 [Rec. 42, 97]
asserted his adverse claim by filing an action to quiet
title against respondents.
Respondent having the certainty of actual knowledge
of appellant's adverse elaim to the ground, is bound by
the rule that:
''The owner's actual knowledge of the adverse
possession is equivalent to, and dispenses with
the necessity of, open and notorious possession.''
[Section 45, Adverse Pos.session, 2 Corpus Secundum, page 559].
'' . . . . that is, he [adverse claimant] must
show actual knowledge of the real ·owner that he
claims in opposition to, and in definance of his
title, or he must show such occupancy and user,
so open, notorious, and inconsistent with as well
as injurious to the rights of the true owner, that
the law will authorize from such facts the pre..
sumption of such knowledge by the true owner.
Heckesher v. Cooper, 203 Mo. 278, 293, 101 S. W.
658, 662, quoting from Hennewell vs. Bushott,
152 Mo. 611, 54 S. W. 487."- Burnside vs. Doolittle, 24 S. W. 2nd 1011, 324 Mo. 722.
POINT II
APPELLANT DID TAKE POSSESSION OF THE
GRO·UND, AND AS OCCUPANT USE IT FOR INVESTMENT,
ETC., ADVERSELY.
~eS'pondents'

second point is directed to the thought
that appellant "never took possession". They endeavor
to make it appear that appellant never took pnssession
of the ground and assert that it is controverted that
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appellant went upon the ground. Respondents do not
show any reference to facts in the record to disprove
that appellant actually went upon the ground [Rec. 1719, 45-52] and thereby took 'possession-but only argue
the statutory effect, from their viewpoint, of the presumptions they deduce from our statutes.
However, respondents again omit the complete picture of the la,Y, by failing to note that, even in the case
of a v<>id deed, that the following rule requiring initially
an entry is all that is required at that time, as is indicated:
" .... A void deed doesn't operate to give
the grantee constructive possession of the land
where it is not shown to have been followed by
an actual entry, it cannot serve to give adverse
possession.''- [Section 129- Possession Under
an Invalid Tax Deed, 1 American Juris prudence,
Page 865].
Appellant's tax deed was prima facie valid and unassailed all through the years 1939 to 1951, but, assuming even to the contrary, which is not conceded, still,
under the principle above enun1erated, it cannot he said
that appellant did not go upon the land, making his
entry, and establish his possession [Rec. 17-19, 45-52],
as so definitely asserted by respondents, and, there is
no CONTRARY EVIDENCE to controvert the actual
physical fact of his going and setting foot on the ground.
Respondents' counsel in further argument under
this second point makes the very misconstruction of Section 104-2-7, U.C.A., 1943, or 104-12-7, Ch. 58, Session
!jaws of Utah, 1951, against which they \Yere warned by
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appellant's discussion under his point "(E)", entitled
''Presumptions'' as set forth at page 13 of his brief,
in assuming that the statute in question reads as '' ....
the pers.on establishing THE legal title to such property shall be presumed to have been possessed, etc..... ''
whereas in fact the statute reads: " . . . . the person
establishing A legal title to such property, shall be presumed to have been [)Ossessed, etc..... ", and assumes
to claim for themselves the benefits of the presumption
given by such statute, whereas actually, the presumption is operative only after the determination of whether
"A" legal title exists in appellant or respondent, or
·both-in other words it is a case of putting the cart
before the horse, to claim the benefit of the presumption
before the determination of title is made.
Respondents' counsel very blandly claims, without
citing any authority therefor, that appellant's construction of the phrase, ''the ordinary use of the occupant''
[.A:ppellant 's Brief, pages 8-11], is the purpose, rather
than the use, made of the land, and, just dismisses any
further consideration of the matter fr·om his mind-and
tries to lead the discussion away from that point by
ignoring it, since he cannot refute it!!
Purpose is defined as: ''That which one sets
before himself as an object to be obtained, the
end or aim t·o be kept in vie'¥ in any plan measuring exertion or operation." [Webster's New
International Dictionary, 2nd Edition].
Use is defined a.s: (Law) That enjoyment of
property which consists in its e1nployment, occupation, exercise or practise". [Webster's New
Internati·onal Dictionary, 2nd Edition].
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\Y.ebster defines "to use" among other definitions as ''to n1ake use of'', ''to convert to one's
service", ... to avail oneself of", "to put to a
purpose''. [43 Words & Phrases, Permanent
Edition, page 475].
''The 'vord 'use' is synonymous with employment. Common meaning of use is to employ for
accomplishment of a purpose, turn to account.''
[43 \Y. ords & Phrases, Permanent Edition, page
478].
No\Y all that is required by Section 104-2-9, Utah
Code Annotated 1943, or Section 104-12-9, Chapter 58,
Laws 1951, Pages 182-3, is that land be put to the'' ORDINARY USE OF THE OCCUPANT". It certainly
appears that the occupant has his choice of uses-merely
because he chooses differently than respondent or respondents' counsel would choose.- does not deprive him
·of the benefits of the statute.
Investment can be just as much of an employment
or use, or turning to account, or accomplishment of an
end as any other use or usage of ground.
Century Dictionary defines the word invest
as follows: ''To employ for some pr~ofitable use .
. . . " [22 Words & Phrases, Permanent Edition,
Pages 529-30].
The placing of capital or laying out of money
in a 'vay intended to secure income or pr~ofit from
its employment is an investment as that word is
commonly used and understood.'' [22 Words &
Phrases, Permanent Edition, Page 536].
The word ''invest'' 1neans to convert into
son1e other form of wealth, usually of a more or
less permanent value, to employ for son1e profitSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

8

able use, to plan so that it will be safe and yield
a profit, . . . . [22 Words & Phrases, Permanent
Edition, page 536].
The conclusion is inescapable that the appellant
employed this pr~operty for his ordinary use, and that
such use continued for more than seven years, with a
consequent barring of respondents' rights-if any they
had-in this ground.
POINT III
APPELLANT'S ACTS OF POSSESSION WERE MORE
THAN CASUAL, OCCASIONAL TRESPASSES-ACTUALLY
ADVERSE POSSESSION.

Respondents' third point of argument is directed
to attacking appellant's possession as casual and occasional and without basis for adverse possession.
There is no evidence in the record to show appellant
originally entered or occupied the land as a tenant of
respondent, or had any former possession of the land
by reason of dealings with respondents. Appellants
claimed under a tax deed-a wholly independent source
of title-a claim which was manifested to respondents
from the beginning, and brought hon1e to them immediately, on the purchase from the county, and again
when an action ·to quiet title was instituted against them
in 1941. Respondents cannot plead ignorance of appellant's adverse claims.
Appellant took possession-he became an occupant
by putting up signs and giving notice to all and sundry of his claimed proprietorship of the land, he held
it for a proper use, continuous and undisturbed, and
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'vent upon the land from time to time to see that his
signs and occupancy were uno:p·posed, he complained to
the school authorities and had the school land fenced
off from his land 'Yhen school children strayed off the
playgrounds onto appellant's ground; he had the ground
plowed-he never saw· the respondent there-he never
had any interference with his originally ·established
possession and the purpose for which he was holding
the ground. Having once established himself as the
occupant he continued to hold the possession, with a
definite usage permitted him by la\Y-no one ever tried
to put him off or barred his occupancy.
POINT IV
DOCTRINE OF DAY VS. STEELE DO·ES NO·T PRECLUDE RECOVERY HERE BY APPELLANT-INAPPLICABILITY.

Respondents' fourth point relies upon the situation
of Day vs. Steele, 111 Utah 481, 184 Pac. 2nd 216 to
attempt to preclude appellant's recovery in this cause.
. The gist of respondents' contention is that comparison of the facts of adverse possession as contended
by him with respect to this case, make such a parallel
with the situation in the Day vs. Steele Case as to
bring it within the application of the principles there
set forth. Respondents err, however, in overlooking
the :point that many of the various acts of the appellant
in this case are used only for the purpose of establishing
his occupancy of the ground, rather than his whole
case of adverse possession, and, appellant, under our
theory, having established himself as occupant, is then
at liberty to rely on his ordinary usage for investment,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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etc., as such occupant to divest title from respondents
by adverse possession, as shown in point '' (C) '' entitled
Ordinary Use of the Occupant, pages 8-11, Appellant's
Brief.
Respondents (Page 9-10 their brief) quote at great
length from the case of D. H. Peery Estat~e vs. Ford, 46
Utah 436, 151 P. 59, at page 65, to further bolster their
contentions anent adverse possession, but again overlook the essential difference basic to the Peery case
and the instant situation, which makes that alleged
authority totally inapplicable here. There is here involved the matter of adverse possession under a written
instrument, while in the Peery Case, the dispute was
over a parcel of surplus or excess ground, not originally
within the deeded areas of either· of the con testing
parties, and it did not appear from the actions detailed,
that defendant's use was so equivocal as to make it an
absolutely adverse usage. Such language from the
quoted excerpt is therefore applicable to a wholly different situation than existed here.
POINT V
APPELLANT DID OCCUPY THE LAND CONTINUOUSLY, HOSTILELY, EXCLUSIVELY, OPENLY, AND NOTORIOUSLY.

Respondents' fifth point, comprising the same iten1s
as his first ·point, makes claim that there was no continuously hostile, open, notorious, and exclusive possession by appellant.
Respondents assume that appellant's visits were
limited to one per year, and that there -vvas something
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clandestine, or stealthy in making the same; whereas
the truth of the matter is other,Yise than the slurring
inferences drawn by respondents. Appellant's visits
were at least once a. year, and at times oftener [Rec.
17-19, 45-52], and it does not appear that he went at
night, by the light of a candle, or something of that sort,
or at other out of the way times, but that he went openly,
and at times with a ""Vvitness [Rec. 56]. Certainly su~ch
course of action "\Yas open and above board. As previously set out, respondents were aware of appellant's
adverse claims by direct notification-and open, notorious possession was not needful to advise them of the
appellant's adverse and hostile claims to the propertybut, even so, as respondent Davey testified, he himself
found on the ground, appellant's "for rent" sign to inform him of appellant's claim to the ground as ownerlandlord!! And the court may judge from a comparis·on
of exhibits ''G" and "H", just how little appellant's
signs were as stated by the respondents! ! They weren't
as microscopic as respondents would have us believe ! !
POINT VI
TELONIS VS. STALEY DO·CTRINE SHOULD STILL BE
ABROGATED.

Respondents' sixth point, discussing appellant's
argument for abrogating the continuance of the Rule of
Telonis vs. Staley, saliently ignores the principle contention of appellant, and then goes on to misstate the
fact that the only ground for departure froin the rule
and venturing into the reahns of conjecture revolves
around a cited California decision. Perhaps it is good
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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tactics to ignore an argument that cannot well ·be refuted or readily answered, but, by so doing the implication of acquiescence arises.
The language of our Supreme Court on page 517 of
144 Pacific 2nd (Telonis vs. Staley, 104 Utah 537) makes
it clear that lack of eurative statutes relating to the
lack of the auditor's eertificate was a prime reason for
holding it an essential step in the tax procedure, and invalidating tax deeds based on proceedings where it ·was
lacking-but, now, due to the fact that the enactment
of Sections 104-2-5 to 104-2.5-11, Chapter 19, Session
Laws of Utah, 1951, that general rather than specific
curative acts are on the books in an attempt to cure all
and not just some tax procedural flaws-the old reason
for holding the affidavits essential no longer exists. Since
the reason for the rule has gone by the board, the reason
for holding to the doctrine of Telonis vs. Staley should
no longer be held applicable to avoid tax sales.
Further, when our Court has cited the California
view applicable to a situation, as it did in construing
similar Utah statutes to those of California, in Telonis
vs. Staley, supra, it is in order to sho\v the illogical
situation resulting from not applying the same strictness of the rule in a case like Steele vs. San Luis Obispo,
152 California 785, 93 Pacific 1020, as a basis for showing how continued further a·pplication of the principle
would result in an untoward holding, and, there is no
venturing into conjectural fields, since the logic of the
situation is that if the line of reasoning of the California courts is followed in one instance, the same re-
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sults as they have achieved in other situations might
follow here, too.
POINT VII
ALLEGED WRONGFUL ASSESSMENT OF NO AVAIL
TO RESPONDENT.

Respondents' seventh point, is a last ditch, desperate effort, to save their case, should the ruling of this
Honorable Court, as it should be, be adverse to their
contentions. In the first place, it is to be noted that the
basis of such error is alleged to be supported by respondents' quoted extract from Tintic Undine Minilng
Comp.any vs. Ercanbrack, 74 Pacific 2nd, 1184, 93 Utah
561, which was by the very words of that ,case limited:
'' . . . By what is here said we do not hold
that in every case any one of the irregularities
appearing in this record and set forth and enumerated as (a) to (k) inclusive renders a tax sale
void. . . . '' [1189, 74 Pac. 2nd].
Further, respondents overlook the fact that irrespective of whether their claimed error in this last point
is sustained or not, that if appellant's contentions with
respect to adverse possession are sustained, as they
ought to be, that that pur:p·orted defect, even if dignified as such, is still of no avail to respondents since appellant's title by adverse possession, even if the tax deed
were defective on this last iten1, would still overcome
the effect of such.
For these reasons, and those set forth in appellant's
original brief in this cause, it is therefore respectfully
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urged that the holding and decree of the trial court be
reversed in conformity with appellant's contentions as
expressed on this appeal.
Respectfully submitted,
MILTON

V.

BACKMAN

BACKMAN' BACKMAN

of
&

CLARK

and

R.

s. JOHNSON
Attorneys for Plaintiff
and A pp,ellarnt.
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